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This paper studies the determinacy properties of monetary and fiscal policy rules in a
small-scale New Keynesian model. We modify the standard model in two ways. First, we
allow positive public debt in the steady state as in Leeper [Journal of Monetary
Economics 27, 129–147 (1991)]. Second, we add rule-of-thumb consumers as in Bilbiie
[Journal of Economic Theory 140, 162–196 (2008)]. Leeper studied a model in which
Ricardian equivalence holds, and he showed that monetary and fiscal policy can be
studied independently. In Bilbiie’s analysis, rule-of-thumb consumers break the Ricardian
equivalence and generate important consequences for the design of monetary policy. In
his model, steady-state public debt was equal to zero. We study a model with both
rule-of-thumb consumers and positive steady-state public debt. We find that the mix of
fiscal and monetary policies that guarantees equilibrium determinacy is sensitive to the
exact values of the parameters of the model.
Keywords: Rule-of-thumb consumers, Ricardian equivalence, Public debt,
Monetary–fiscal policy interactions
1. INTRODUCTION
When Ricardian equivalence holds, monetary and fiscal policy can be studied
independently. For instance, in the logic presented in Leeper (1991), the joint
design of monetary and fiscal policy reduces to two separable problems, which
can be addressed recursively. When the monetary dynamics is determinate, local
determinacy needs government debt dynamics to evolve passively in a stable
manner. In contrast, if a system without fiscal policy exhibits one degree of inde-
terminacy, then potentially unstable debt dynamics is needed to restore equilibrium
determinacy. This is consistent with Leeper’s notion of active fiscal policy.
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However, the assumptions behind this approach are often questionable, and it
has therefore been argued that its policy conclusions can be misleading.1 When for
any reason Ricardian equivalence breaks down, monetary and fiscal policy cannot
be studied separately.
Pursuing this theme further, this paper studies the stabilizing properties of
monetary and fiscal policy in a small-scale New Keynesian model.2 We modify
the standard framework in two ways. First, we allow a positive public debt in
the steady state, as in Leeper (1991). Second, we introduce alongside traditional
optimizing agents a share of rule-of-thumb consumers as in Bilbiie (2008). Rule-
of-thumb consumers are excluded from participating in financial markets; i.e., they
cannot hold public debt in order to smooth consumption over time, but simply
consume their disposable labor income in each period. The main advantage of this
modeling approach is that departures from Ricardian equivalence can be modeled
conveniently through a change in a single parameter, which is the share of rule-
of-thumb consumers present in the system. When this share is positive, both types
of consumers pay the burden of public debt but only the optimizers benefit from
it. Public debt becomes net wealth in the sense of Barro (1974) and consequently
a relevant state variable that has to be taken into account for the equilibrium
dynamics of the system.
Moreover, as stressed in the literature on limited asset market participation [Galı´
et al. (2004), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007), Bilbiie (2008), Colciago (2011)],
the introduction of a set of rule-of-thumb consumers can drastically change the
determinacy conditions of an otherwise standard New Keynesian monetary model.
As explained in Bilbiie (2008), these results stem from the implication that the
consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers is sensitive to real wages, but not to
interest rates. In turn, variations in real wages affect profits, thus impacting the
consumption decisions of the optimizers. Higher interest rates depress wages, but
raise profits enough to boost the demand of the optimizers. With a sufficiently
large share of rule-of-thumb consumers, this boost is enough to offset the decline
in demand from rule-of-thumb consumers, thus raising aggregate demand. In this
case, determinacy may require passive monetary policy, whereby the central bank
lowers the real interest rate in response to positive inflation.
We extend the results presented in Leeper (1991) and Bilbiie (2008) by studying
the effects generated by the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers on the interac-
tions between monetary and fiscal policy. First, when steady-state public debt is
zero, monetary and fiscal policy making reduce to two separable problems, as in
Leeper’s work. We show that his logic extends to the case where the share of rule-
of-thumb consumers is moderate. In contrast, when the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers is large, equilibrium determinacy requires both monetary and fiscal
policy to be active or both to be passive.
Second, when steady-state public debt is positive, monetary policy actions
generate fiscal consequences. Furthermore, fiscal adjustments feed back onto the
other endogenous variables of the model through wealth effects on aggregate
demand that arise from the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. For intermediate
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values of steady-state public debt and for both moderate and high values of the
share of rule-of-thumb consumers, we find that the fiscal and monetary policies
that ensure the determinacy of equilibrium are sensitive to the exact values of the
parameters of the model.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it extends the logic
of Leeper (1991) in a non-Ricardian world. Therefore, our exercise can be seen
as complementary to the work on the interaction between monetary and fiscal
policy in New Keynesian models with non-Ricardian consumers a` la Blanchard
(1985), e.g., Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and Leith and von Thadden (2008).
With this type of consumers, Ricardian equivalence fails because agents have
a constant probability of death. Hence, as in the model proposed here, public
debt produces wealth effects and has to be taken into account in the determinacy
analysis. Similarly, our paper relates to models where Ricardian equivalence fails
because of the presence of income taxation and steady-state public debt, as in
Linnemann (2006) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
Second, it extends the logic spelled out by Bilbiie (2008) on the fiscal policy
side. Our exercise contributes to the literature that studies the consequences for
equilibrium determinacy of introducing rule-of-thumb consumers in a sticky price
environment, e.g., Galı` et al. (2004), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007), Motta
and Tirelli (2010), Colciago (2011) and Ascari et al. (2011). However, the cited
literature concentrates exclusively on the monetary policy effects of rule-of-thumb
consumers. A key difference of our study is that we instead focus on the conse-
quences of introducing rule-of-thumb consumers for interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the
model, Section 3 discusses the main results of the paper, and Section 4 concludes.
2. MODEL
The economy consists of two types of households, a continuum of firms producing
differentiated goods in a monopolistic competitive–sticky price environment, a
perfectly competitive labor market, a central bank in charge of monetary policy,
and a government in charge of fiscal policy.
The totality of households is normalized to unity. Of this, a fraction (1 − λ), with
λ ≤ 1, behaves in a traditional forward-looking, optimizing way. Hence, this frac-
tion maximizes lifetime utility, holds profits coming from the monopolistic nature
of the goods market, and participates in perfect and complete financial markets.
We define the remaining λ households as rule-of-thumb consumers (henceforth
ROTC) as in Galı´ et al. (2004, 2007) and Bilbiie (2008). For these consumers,
all their wealth is represented by their after-tax wage and therefore they cannot
smooth consumption over time. Variables with the suffixes “o” and “r” indicate


















where Et is the rational expectations operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,
Cot is the level of consumption of the optimizers, and Not is the optimizers’ labor
supply. The parameter χ, with χ ∈ (0,∞), indicates how leisure is valued relative
to consumption. The parameter η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
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where Pt (j) is the price level of the variety of good j , Wt is the nominal wage,
t are the nominal profits coming from the monopolistic competitive firms, Bt+1
is the nominal payoff of the one-period riskless bond purchased at time t, Rt is
the gross nominal return on bonds purchased in period t , Qt,t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor for one-period-ahead payoff, Pt is the aggregate price level, and
Vt is the nominal payoff of a state-contingent asset portfolio.3 The government is
assumed to service the public debt by levying a lump-sum tax, τt . We define So as
a transfer such that at steady state the two types of agents have the same level of
consumption and supply the same amount of labor.4
Optimizers first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across
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where the parameter ε represents the elasticity of substitution among goods. The
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2.2. Rule-of-thumb consumers
The utility function of ROTC is represented by a single-period expression. In
particular, following Galı´ et al. (2004, 2007), it is assumed that the shape of the
instantaneous utility is the same for the two types of agents. Therefore




1 + η . (6)
As stressed earlier, ROTC do not participate in financial markets and do not hold




t (j) dj = WtNrt − Ptτt − PtSr , (7)
where Crt (j) and Nrt are the level of consumption of each j product and the labor
supply of ROTC. On the consumption side, ROTC are forced to consume all their
income in each period; therefore, consumption can easily be inferred from (7).










The firms’ problem is standard and therefore this subsection can be skipped by
some readers without loss of continuity.
In this economy, firms are assumed to possess an identical linear production
technology of the type
Yt (j) = Nt (j) (9)







Following the New Keynesian literature, we assume sticky prices a` la Calvo
(1983). In each period there is a (randomly selected) set of firms, (1 − θ) with
θ < 1, that reset their prices optimally, whereas the remaining θ keep their prices
fixed. When a firm is allowed to reset its prices, it takes into account the expected
future stream of profits discounted for the probability of not resetting its prices.
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where qt,t+1 = β(Cot /Cot+1) is the real stochastic discount factor and mct = Wt/Pt
represents real marginal costs. The first-order condition with respect to P ∗t (j ) and
the aggregate price level are
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. (13)
2.4. Aggregation rules and market-clearing condition
The aggregate expressions for consumption and labor are simply the weighted
averages of the single consumer-type variables. Therefore, aggregate consumption
is
Ct = λCrt + (1 − λ)Cot (14)
and aggregate labor follows
Nt = λNrt + (1 − λ)Not . (15)
Without capital accumulation, everything produced must be consumed in the
same period. Hence,
Yt (j) = Ct (j) . (16)
The aggregate production is






)−εdj is a measure of aggregate price dispersion and Yt =∫ 1
0 Yt (j) dj . Given our assumption of zero steady state inflation, fluctuations of
st around the steady state are of second-order importance,5 and therefore can
be ignored in the present analysis, which employs a first-order approximation.
At equilibrium, total demand is equal to total supply. Hence, defining Ct =∫ 1
0 Ct (j) dj, we get
Yt = Ct . (18)
2.5. Monetary policy
Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate, Rt, in every period. In line with
the literature on New Keynesian monetary policy, e.g., Bernanke and Woodford
(1998), Clarida et al. (2000), Woodford (2003, Chap. 4), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2005), and Bilbiie (2008), we approximate monetary policy by a simple forward-
looking Taylor rule of the type
Rt = R (Etπt+1)φ , (19)
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where R = 1/β is the steady state interest rate and πt = Pt/Pt−1 represents the
inflation rate. The single policy parameter φ in (19) is the Taylor coefficient, as
discussed in the literature on interest rate rules inspired by Taylor (1993).6
Accordingly, following Leeper (1991), monetary policy is called active (passive)
if the nominal interest rate, Rt, rises more (less) than one for one with the expected
inflation rate, i.e., if φ > 1 (φ < 1).
2.6. Government and fiscal policy
The government uses lump-sum taxes, τt , to service the public debt. The govern-
ment budget constraint can be expressed in real terms as
R−1t bt+1 = π−1t bt − τt , (20)
where bt+1 = Bt+1/Pt .
Furthermore, we assume that fiscal policy follows a rule of the type
τt = (1 − β) b + δ(bt − b), (21)
where δ is a policy parameter identifying how taxation responds to government
debt.
Unlike monetary policy, there is no widely accepted specification for fiscal
policy. The rule adopted here is similar to the one considered in Davig and Leeper
(2006), Linnemann (2006), and Leith and von Thadden (2008). Although the struc-
ture of the fiscal rule is basic, it nevertheless allows the study of the interactions
between monetary and fiscal policy using the logic of Leeper (1991).
2.7. Equilibrium
The nonlinear structural equations of the model are log-linearized around the
nonstochastic steady state. We present the model in terms of aggregate variables.
A variable with a circumflex identifies log deviation from its steady state value;
e.g., ˆCt = log (Ct/C) . Furthermore, we define τ˜t = τt−τY and b˜t = bt−bY .
The equations of the model are
(i) the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
πˆt = βEt πˆt+1 + σ ˆYt (22)
(ii) the dynamic IS curve augmented for the presence of ROTC,
ˆYt = Et ˆYt+1 − 
(
ˆRt − Et πˆt+1
)+  (Et τ˜t+1 − τ˜t ) (23)
(iii) the government budget constraint,
β
(˜
bt+1 − γ ˆRt
)+ τ˜t = (˜bt − γ πˆt) (24)
(iv) the monetary rule,
ˆRt = φEt πˆt+1 (25)
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(v) the fiscal policy rule,
τ˜t = δb˜t (26)
where
κ = (1 − θ) (1 − θβ)
θ
,

















ηε + ε − 1
)]
and γ = B/Y identifies the steady state debt-to-output ratio.7
A few points are worth stressing. First, the presence of ROTC dramatically
affects the dynamic IS equation (23), i.e., the demand side of the economy, via
. This parameter identifies the elasticity of aggregate demand to real interest
rates and taxes. It is linked in a nonlinear way to λ, the share of ROTC, and to
η, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor. Both the size and the sign of 
can drastically alter the transmission mechanism and local determinacy properties
of the model. For example, an interest rate change modifies the intertemporal
consumption and labor supply decisions of the optimizers. This affects aggregate
demand, real wages, and consequently the consumption of ROTC, who simply
consume their disposable labor income. At the same time, movements in real
wages—and hence in marginal costs—cause variations in profits that are held
exclusively by the optimizers. Similarly, changes in the real interest rate modify
the return of public debt assets possessed by the optimizers. These financial
effects work in the opposite direction relative to the traditional intertemporal
Euler equation logic: whereas the latter implies a contractionary effect of higher
real interest rate, the former has the opposite effect.8
As argued by Bilbiie and Straub (2004) and Bilbiie (2008), the sign of 
determines which of these two channels prevails. As is known, the sign of 
depends both on the share of ROTC—i.e., the higher the value of λ, the stronger
the financial effects of interest rate movements—and on the elasticity of labor
supply—i.e. the higher η, the higher the sensitivity of real wage to interest rate.
A necessary condition for  > 0 is






Figure 1 sketches the sign of  in the (λ − η) space. As can be seen,  remains
positive for combinations of high values of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
i.e., low η, and high shares of ROTC, i.e., high λ, or vice versa.9
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FIGURE 1. Signs of  and λ∗ in the λ–η space. Below the line,  > 0. Above the line,
 < 0.
Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the range of parameter values where
 is positive, an increase in ROTC share increases the sensitivity of aggregate
demand to interest rate movements; i.e. increasing the interest rate affects real
wages negatively. This implies lower consumption for ROTC. At the same time, a
higher interest rate has a traditional effect on optimizers’ consumption. In contrast,
when λ > λ∗, as λ tends to its upper limit 1,  decreases (in absolute value)
asymptotically toward zero. In other words, interest rate policies are ineffective
when no one holds assets.
The immediate consequence of these effects generated by the presence of ROTC
is that an economy that displays a negative  requires a passive monetary policy
rule for determinacy.
Second, both types of consumers pay the burden of public debt, but only the
optimizers benefit from it. Hence, public debt is net wealth in the sense of Barro
(1974), Ricardian equivalence does not hold, and equilibrium dynamics is driven
by a genuine interaction between monetary and fiscal policy.
The main focus and contribution of the present study are the consequences of




The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency.10 We assume the elasticity of
substitution among goods, ε, to be equal to 6. This implies a steady-state markup
of 20%, which is in line with the majority of the macro literature. The discount
factor β has been fixed at 0.99, so that the real annual interest rate is 4%. As in
most of the New Keynesian literature, we assume that prices remain unchanged on
the average for one year. Therefore, θ is fixed at 0.75. These parameters are kept at
baseline values throughout the following examples. We then turn to the parameters
for which some sensitivity analysis is conducted, by examining a range of values
in addition to their baseline settings. The model is solved with several pairs of λ,
the share of ROTC, and η, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, depending
on whether the aim is to study a situation where  is positive or negative.11
Further, we solve the model with various levels of debt-to-GDP ratios, 0%,
60%, and 80%. Similarly, in order to describe the active–passive policy mix, the
determinacy conditions are analyzed for a broad range of monetary and fiscal
policy parameters.12
3.2. Determinacy
The determinacy of the model follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Assumption 1. For  > 0 assumes that γ < 1/σ .
The restriction on the steady state level of public debt is innocuous. For standard
parameter values, Assumption 1 implies an upper limit on public debt far above
400% of total output.
PROPOSITION 1. Let  > 0, ¯φ = 2(1+β)+σ−2γσ
σ+2βγσ , ¯δ =
(1+β)[2(1+β)+σ(1−φ)]
σ(1−φ−2γ)+2[1+β(1−γσφ)] , Assumption 1 hold, and φ ∈ [0,+∞). The neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the determinacy of the dynamic system defined by
(22)–(26) is [
φ ∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)]
∪ [φ /∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ /∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] .
Furthermore, ¯δ is bounded below by (1 + β) , increasing in the share of ROTC,
i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂λ > 0, increasing in the level of steady-state public debt, i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂γ > 0
and increasing in the monetary policy parameter, i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂φ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
COROLLARY 1. If λ and/or γ equal zero, then ¯φ = 1+2 (1+β)
σ
and ¯δ = 1+β.
Corollary 1 underlines that Proposition 1 perfectly nests Leeper’s logic when
there is no steady state public debt and/or ROTC are not present in the system.
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When this is the case, public debt dynamics is completely uncoupled from the
rest of the model. Therefore monetary and fiscal policy can be studied as two
independent problems. For example, when fiscal policy acts in such a way that
government debt dynamics evolves passively in a stable manner, i.e., δ ∈ (1 −
β, 1 + β), equilibrium determinacy is guaranteed by an active monetary policy,
which, following the Taylor principle,13 anchors inflation expectations. However,
if the Taylor principle is abandoned, so that a passive monetary policy fails to
control inflation expectations, then determinacy needs fiscal policy to be set in an
active way so that debt dynamics is potentially unstable; i.e., δ /∈ (1 − β, 1 + β).
When steady-state public debt is nonzero and, ceteris paribus, the share of
ROTC is positive, the government budget constraint is no longer uncoupled from
the rest of the model. Movements in nominal interest rate and current inflation
feedback on public debt, which in turn feeds back on the rest of the model via the
demand side of the economy.
Here, there are a few points worth stressing. First, the fiscal parameter limit,
upper or lower depending on whether monetary policy is active or passive, i.e., ¯δ,
is bounded below by (1 + β) and is increasing in the share of ROTC, in the steady
state level of public debt, and in the monetary policy parameter.
At a microeconomic level, the intuition for this can be explained as follows.
Assume that monetary policy follows the Taylor principle, i.e., φ > 1, so that the
nominal rate increases more than expected inflation, and suppose that a positive,
nonfundamental shock hits agents’ inflation expectations. The increase in the real
interest rate leads to a decrease in the consumption of the optimizers, and hence a
decrease in the demand for goods. This causes downward pressure on real wages
and consequently an additional reduction of consumption of ROTC. Moreover,
nominal price rigidities imply that lower demand induces some firms to lower
their prices and others to decrease labor demand. This, in turn, implies a further
decrease in the equilibrium real wage. On the other hand, a higher real interest rate
causes an increase in the burden of public debt and, via the fiscal rule, an increase
in taxation. The distortive nature of fiscal policy implies that each rise in taxation
leads to a reduction in ROTC consumption. This reduction mechanism causes
another decrease in the equilibrium real wage (and marginal cost). These fiscal
effects, obtained by the combined presence of ROTC and steady state public debt,
put further downward pressure on current and expected inflation, thus invalidating
the initial increase in expectations. As a result there is a weaker response (than
a Ricardian scenario) during the transition path of interest rate, public debt, and
taxation. In other words, the presence of a share of ROTC allows fiscal policy to
induce a stationary path of public debt even when δ ∈ [(1 + β) , ¯δ].
Moreover, the mechanism described is stronger (i) the higher the share of
ROTC, i.e., high presence of credit-constrained agents increases the distortive
effects of fiscal policy; (ii) the higher the steady state level of public debt, i.e., high
steady state public debt increases monetary feed-back on the government budget
constraint, in turn amplifying the effects of fiscal policy; and (iii) the stronger the
monetary policy reaction to inflation expectations, i.e., strong reactions to inflation
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FIGURE 2. Determinacy analysis with positive. Determinacy (white areas), indeterminacy
(black areas), and instability (red areas).
expectations, all else being equal, increase the wealth effects of fiscal policy on
aggregate demand.
Similarly, when monetary policy is passive, i.e., φ < 1, it may fail to threaten to
put the economy on an explosive-inflation path for any deviation from the unique
rational-expectations equilibrium. In this case, equilibrium determinacy requires
setting fiscal policy in an active way so that debt dynamics are potentially unstable.
To do so, fiscal policy needs to be more aggressive against public debt compared
to a scenario where steady state public debt equals zero or only optimizer agents
exist, i.e., δ > ¯δ.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the determinacy results. The numerical values
are taken from the benchmark parameterization, as described in Section 3.1.
Each subplot details the combinations of the monetary policy parameter and
the fiscal policy parameter which ensure determinacy (blanks), indeterminacy
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(black spots), and instability (red spots). Moving from left to right across subplots
increases the level of steady state public debt, whereas moving down the page
increases the extent of ROTC. Consistent with the previously described economic
mechanism, the higher the share of ROTC, the steady state level of public debt, or
the monetary policy parameter, the great the possibility that fiscal policy reactions
greater than 1 + β generate determinacy (indeterminacy) when monetary policy
is active (passive). For example, with 35% of ROTC, η = 1, a steady state public
debt–to–output ratio of 60%, and a monetary policy parameter of 1.2, ¯δ = 2.74,
whereas if φ = 0.8, η = 1, and γ = 2.4, ¯δ = 2.35.
Next, we analyze the equilibrium dynamics when  turns negative.
Assumption 2. For  < 0, assume that  ≤ −2+2β2γ σ+σφ+2γ σφ .
Assumption 2 implies an upper bound on the share of ROTC well above available
estimates.14 Although this assumption keeps the algebra simple, it is neutral in
relation to the present analysis.
PROPOSITION 2. Let  < 0, ¯φ = 2(1+β)+σ−2γσ
σ+2βγσ , ¯δ =
(1+β)[2(1+β)+σ(1−φ)]
σ(1−φ−2γ)+2[1+β(1−γσφ)] , Assumption 2 hold, and φ ∈ [0,+∞). The nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the determinacy of the dynamic system defined
by (22)–(26) is [
φ ∈ (max ( ¯φ, 0) , 1) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)]
∪ [φ > 1 ∩ δ /∈ (1 − δ, ¯δ)]
Furthermore, ¯δ is bounded above by (1 + β), increasing in the share of ROTC,
i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂λ > 0, decreasing in the steady-state public debt, i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂γ < 0, and
decreasing in the monetary policy parameter, i.e., ∂ ¯δ/∂φ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
COROLLARY 2. If γ equals zero, then ¯φ = 1 + 2 (1+β)
σ
and ¯δ = 1 + β.
Corollary 2 shows that when < 0 and γ = 0, determinacy properties perfectly
nest within the logic of Leeper (1991) and of Bilbiie (2008). As discussed, in
this case, when fiscal policy acts in such a way that government debt dynamics
evolves passively in a stable manner, i.e., δ ∈ (1 − β, 1 + β), monetary policy,
in order to anchor expectations, needs to abandon the Taylor principle, as in
Bilbiie and Straub (2004) and Bilbiie (2008). However, if the system without
fiscal policy exhibits one degree of indeterminacy, then equilibrium determinacy
requires setting fiscal policy in an active way so that debt dynamics is potentially
unstable; i.e., δ /∈ (1 − β, 1 + β). This stops being true as steady state public debt
turns positive.
There are a few further points worthy of comment. First, the fiscal parameter
limit, lower or upper depending on whether monetary policy is active or passive,
i.e., ¯δ, is bounded above by (1 + β) and is decreasing in the steady state level of
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public debt and in the monetary policy parameter and is increasing in the share of
ROTC.
The intuition for this is as follows. As before, assume that agents suddenly
expect higher inflation and monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. As γ turns
positive, a higher interest rate feeds back on the government budget constraint,
putting upward pressure on public debt and, via the fiscal rule, on taxes. As
before, higher taxes and a higher interest rate depress ROTC demand and put
downward pressure on real wages, and hence on marginal costs. Lower marginal
costs generate an increase in profits. When  < 0, the positive wealth effect
generated by a higher return on public debt assets and higher profits feeds back
into the system via the optimizers’ budget constraint, inducing a boost in aggregate
demand. This boost causes a further increase in the real interest rate and an
additional rise in public debt and taxation. As a result, along the transition path,
there is a stronger response (compared to a scenario with no steady state public
debt) of interest rate, public debt, and taxation. In other words, when  < 0 and
γ > 0, fiscal policy may imply a potentially nonstationary path of public debt
for δ ∈ [ ¯δ, (1 + β)]. This, combined with a monetary policy that, following the
Taylor principle, can potentially induce unstable monetary dynamics, generates
determinacy.
Moreover, (i) these effects increase in the monetary policy parameter φ; i.e.,
the higher the interest rate the stronger the boost to the financial wealth of the
optimizers. This generates an increase in aggregate demand, in the real interest
rate, and in public debt. (ii) They also increase in the steady state level of public
debt; i.e., the higher the steady state public debt, the stronger the fiscal wealth
effects. (iii) They decrease in the share of ROTC; i.e., when  < 0,  decreases
(in absolute value) in λ and this mitigates the joint monetary and fiscal transmission
mechanism.
Ceteris paribus, when monetary policy manages, via a passive rule, to anchor
inflation expectations, i.e., φ < 1, equilibrium determinacy requires that public
debt evolve in a stable manner. This in turn imposes an upper limit on the conduct
of fiscal policy such that δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ) .
Figure 3 repeats the graphical explanation for the case  < 0. As discussed, ¯δ
is smaller than 1 + β, i.e., 1.99, decreasing in γ and in φ, and increasing in λ.
For example, when λ = 0.35, η = 4, γ = 2.4, and φ = 1.2 then ¯δ = 1.13. All
else being equal, if γ = 3.2 then ¯δ = 1 and if φ = 0.8 then ¯δ = 1.25. Last, if
λ = 0.45, η = 3, γ = 2.4, and φ = 1.2 then ¯δ = 1.21.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in a small-
scale New Keynesian model. We add to the standard setting a positive level
of steady state public debt as in Leeper (1991) and a share of rule-of-thumb
consumers (ROTC) as in Bilbiie (2008). With these consumers, who do not hold
profits and who are not allowed to engage in financial activities, public debt
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FIGURE 3. Determinacy analysis with negative . Determinacy (white areas), indetermi-
nacy (black areas), and instability (red areas).
becomes net wealth in the sense of Barro (1974) even when all taxation is lump-
sum. Hence, Ricardian equivalence breaks down. Furthermore, as discussed in
Bilbiie and Straub (2004), Galı` et al. (2004), and Bilbiie (2008), the introduction
of a set of ROTC into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model has dramatic
consequences for the conduct of interest rate policies.
With this in mind, this paper analyzes the stabilizing properties of simple
monetary and fiscal rules under the “active/passive” criterion of Leeper (1991).
First, when steady state public debt is zero, monetary and fiscal policy making
reduce to two separable problems. We show that Leeper’s logic extends to the share
of ROTC being moderate. In contrast, with a large share of ROTC, equilibrium
determinacy requires both monetary and fiscal policy to be active or both to be
passive.
Second, when steady state public debt is positive, monetary policy actions
generate fiscal consequences. Furthermore, fiscal policy feeds back onto the other
endogenous variables of the model through wealth effects on aggregate demand
that arise from the presence of ROTC. We show how these effects modify the
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interaction between monetary and fiscal policy from the scenario in which steady
state public debt is equal to zero. In particular, we find that for intermediate
values of steady state public debt and for both moderate and high values of
the share of ROTC, the fiscal and monetary policies that ensure the determi-
nacy of equilibrium are sensitive to the exact values of the parameters of the
model.
This leads to the conclusion that it may be misleading to infer how the monetary
and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics
without explicit reference to the steady state level of government debt and to the
share of ROTC.
NOTES
1. See for example Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
2. See for example Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).
3. Note that given that all the financial assets are held by the optimizers, Vt+1 = (1 − λ) V ot+1.
Therefore V ot+1 = Vt+11−λ . The same thing holds for bonds and profits.
4. The assumption of steady state homogeneity across consumer types is present in most of the
literature on ROTC; see for example Galı´ et al. (2007), Bilbiie (2008), Motta and Tirelli (2010), and
Colciago (2011). As in Galı´ et al. (2007), the steady state transfer greatly simplifies the algebra but is
innocuous for our results.
5. A detailed discussion of this can be found in Woodford (2003).
6. The reason we focus on this particular rule is that, as shown by Bilbiie (2008), it leads to much
more clear-cut determinacy conditions.
7. In Appendix A the reader can find a detailed derivation of the log-linearized equilibrium.
8. Note that these effects of interest rate movements on financial portfolios would be irrelevant if
λ = 0, i.e., no ROTC.
9. The expression for λ∗ is different from the one presented in Bilbiie (2008). This stems from the
fact that here steady state homogeneity is induced via a transfer between the two types of consumers,
whereas Bilbiie (2008) obtains the same effect via a steady state fixed cost of production. However,
the differences between the two approaches are quantitatively negligible.
10. We insert this paragraph before presenting the analytical results. This is because when we present
the analytical results, we make use of simple numerical examples based on this parameterization.
11. In particular, we set η = 1 and λ = 0, 0.2 and 0.35 for  > 0, whereas we fix η = 3, λ = 0.35,
0.45, and 0.55 for  < 0.
12. In particular, we allow φ ∈ (0, 4) and δ ∈ (−1, 3) .
13. Given a forward-looking monetary rule, the Taylor principle has an upper limit; see Woodford
(2003, Ch. 4) for a detailed discussion on the upper limit of forward-looking monetary rules. This
upper bound is decreasing in the share of ROTC and in the steady state level of public debt. However,
for the standard parameterization, this limit is not empirically relevant, and therefore it will be ignored
in what follows. For example, with η = 1, λ = 0.3, γ = 2.4, and ¯φ = 8.13.
14. For example, with φ = 0.8, γ = 0, and η = 3, Assumption 2 implies λ < 0.89. With φ = 1.2,
γ = 2.4 and η = 3, Assumption 2 implies λ < 0.98.
15. It is easy to show that adopting this proof stragety is equivalent in having just one set of conditions
and then studying the bifurcation generated by the sign of .
16. With the benchmark parametrisation i.e. γ = 2.4, η = 1 and φ = 0.8, ¯δ = 2.35and δ˜ = 0.0257.
With γ = 3.2 (all other parameters at their benchmark values), ¯δ = 2.67 and δ˜ = 0.0284. With
φ = 0.5, ¯δ = 2.51 and δ˜ = 0.029.
17. This is formally explained in the next paragraph.
DESIGNING POLICY RULES WITH RULE-OF-THUMB CONSUMERS 17
REFERENCES
Ascari, G., A. Colciago, and L. Rossi (2011) Limited Asset Market Participation: Does it Really Matter
for Monetary Policy. Bank of Finland research discussion paper 15-2011.
Barro, R. (1974) Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095–
1117.
Bernanke, B. and M. Woodford (1998) Inflation forecasts and monetary policy. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 29, 653–685.
Bilbiie, F.O. (2008) Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) Keynesian
logic. Journal of Economic Theory 140, 162–196.
Bilbiie, F.O. and R. Straub (2004) Fiscal Policy, Business Cycles and Labor-Market Fluctuations.
MNB working paper 2004/6.
Blanchard, O. (1985) Debt, deficits, and finite horizons. Journal of Political Economy 93, 223–247.
Calvo, G.A. (1983) Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 12, 383–398.
Carlstrom, T. and S. Fuerst (2005) Investment and interest rate policy: A discrete time analysis. Journal
of Economic Theory 123, 4–20.
Clarida, R., J. Galı´, and M. Gertler (1999) The science of monetary policy: A New Keynesian perspec-
tive. Journal of Economic Literature 37, 1661–1707.
Clarida, R., J. Galı´, and M. Gertler (2000) Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability:
Evidence and some theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 147–180.
Colciago, A. (2011) Rule of thumb consumers meet sticky wages. Journal of Money Credit and
Banking 43, 325–353.
Davig, T. and E. Leeper (2006) Fluctuating macro policies and the fiscal theory. NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 2006, 21, 247–316.
Di Bartolomeo, G. and L. Rossi (2007) Effectiveness of monetary policy and limited asset market
participation: Neoclassical versus Keynesian effects. International Journal of Economic Theory 3,
213–218.
Felippa, C.A. and K.C. Perk (2004) Synthesis Tools for Structural Dynamics and Partitioned Analysis
of Coupled Systems. Mimeo, Aerospace Engineering Sciences and Center for Aerospace Structures.
Galı´, J., D. Lopez-Salido, and J. Valles (2004) Rule-of-thumb consumers and the design of interest
rate rules. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 739–763.
Galı´, J., D. Lopez-Salido, and J. Valles (2007) Understanding the effect of public spending on con-
sumption. Journal of European Economic Association 5, 227–270.
Leeper, E. (1991) Equilibria under “active” and “passive” monetary and fiscal policies. Journal of
Monetary Economics 27, 129–147.
Leith, C. and L. von Thadden (2008) Monetary and fiscal interactions in a New Keynesian model
with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers. Journal of Economic Theory 140, 279–
313.
Leith, C. and S. Wren-Lewis (2000) Interactions between monetary and fiscal policy rules. Economic
Journal 110, 93–108.
Linnemann, L. (2006) Interest rate policy, debt, and the indeterminacy with distortive taxation. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 487–510.
Motta, G. and P. Tirelli (2010) Rule-of-Thumb Consumers, Consumption Habits and the Taylor
Principle, University of Milano-Bicocca WP 194.
Samuelson, P. (1941) Conditions that the roots of a polynomial be less than unity in absolute value.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 12, 360–364.
Schmitt-Grohe´, S. and M. Uribe (2007) Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1702–1725.
Taylor, J. (1993) Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy 39, 195–214.
Woodford M. (2003) Interest and Prices. Princeton University Press.
18 RAFFAELE ROSSI
APPENDIX A: USEFUL DERIVATIONS
We impose steady state homogeneity; hence
Nr = No = N = Cr = Co = C = Y. (A.1)




)− τ˜t , (A.2)
whereas ROTCs’ and optimizers’ labor supplies read as
ˆCrt + η ˆNrt = wˆt , (A.3)
ˆCot + η ˆNot = wˆt . (A.3 bis)
The log-linear optimizers’ Euler equation is
ˆCot = Et ˆCot −
{
ˆRt − Et πˆt+1
}
. (A.4)
Log-linearizations of aggregate consumption and aggregate hours are
ˆCt = λ ˆCrt + (1 − λ) ˆCot , (A.5)
ˆNt = λ ˆNrt + (1 − λ) ˆNot . (A.6)
Combining (A.3) and (A.3bis) with (A.5) and (A.6), we can write
ˆCt + η ˆNt = wˆt . (A.7)












ηε + ε − 1
)
(1 + η) ˆNt −
(
ηε − η
ηε + ε − 1
)
ε
ε − 1 τ˜t ,
(A.8)
where, as in the main text, τ˜t = τt−τY . Using the expression for aggregate consumption, we
can write the Euler equation as
ˆCt − λ ˆCrt = Et ˆCt+1 − λEt ˆCrt+1 − (1 − λ)
{
ˆRt − Et πˆt+1
}
. (A.9)
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where the symbol  identifies the first difference operator. Given that ˆCt = ˆYt = ˆNt, we































Etτ˜t+1 − (1 − λ)
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we can rewrite the Euler equation as
ˆYt = Et ˆYt+1 − 
(
ˆRt − Et πˆt+1
)+  (Et τ˜t+1 − τ˜t ) , (A.12)
whereas on the supply side, the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be written as
πˆt = βEt πˆt+1 + κ (m̂ct ) , (A.13)
where m̂ct is the log-linear expression for the marginal costs and κ = (1−α)(1−αβ)α . Using the
fact that m̂ct = wˆt = ˆCt + η ˆNt = (1 + η) ˆYt , we can rewrite the New Keynesian Phillips
curve as
πˆt = βEt πˆt+1 + σ ˆYt , (A.14)
where σ = (1 + η) κ.
The government has a log-linearized budget constraint of the type
β
(˜
bt+1 − γ ˆRt
)+ τ˜t = (˜bt − γ πˆt) , (A.15)
where, as in the main text, b˜t = bt−bY and γ = bY . Furthermore, we plug the tax rule and the
monetary rule into the Euler equation and the government budget constraint as
ˆYt = Et ˆYt+1 − (φ − 1) Et πˆt+1 + δ
(





bt+1 − γφEt πˆt+1
) = (1 − δ) b˜t − γ πˆt . (A.17)
With these two last equations, together with the New Keynesian Phillips curve of (A.14),
we construct the system of three equations we use for the determinacy analysis.
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APPENDIX B: DETERMINACY ANALYSIS
OF THE 3×3 SYSTEM
B.1. HURWITZ POLYNOMIAL
To derive the main results of the paper analytically, we adopt the technique of transforming
the polynomial obtained from the characteristic equation—see Samuelson (1941) and more
recently, Felippa and Park (2004, Section 4, p. 18) and Ascari et al. (2011). Given the
characteristic polynomial
PA (µ)≡ µn+An−1µn−1+...+An−(n−1)µ +A0, (B.1)
the stability properties would depend on the location of the roots inside the unit circle in
the complex µ plane, i.e., |µi | < 1. It is in general possible to transform this polynomial
into a Hurwitz polynomial PH (ψ) , whose stability properties depend on the location of
the roots in the left-hand plane R (ψ) < 0. To pass from PA (µ) to PH (ψ), one can use
the conformal involuntary transformation
µ =1 + ψ
1 − ψ . (B.2)
Given B.2, we have |µ| ≶ 1 ⇐⇒ ψ ≶ 0.
For the exercise presented in this paper, the third-order characteristic polynomial can be
transformed into the Hurwitz polynomial using µ = 1+ψ1−ψ :
ˆPH (ψ)= (1 + ψ)
3
(1 − ψ)3 +A2
(1 + ψ)2
(1 − ψ)2 +A1
1 + ψ
1 − ψ +A0. (B.3)
Hence, once we expand the polynomial we obtain a quotient of two polynomials;
ˆPH (ψ)=PH (ψ) /QH (ψ) where the roots of ˆPH (ψ) are the roots of PH (ψ) . We then
need to study the stability of the following polynomial
PH (ψ)= ψ3+B2ψ2+B1ψ + B0, (B.4)
where B0 = 1+A2+A1+A01−A2+A1−A0 , B1 =
3+A2−A1−3A0
1−A2+A1−A0 , and B2 =
3−A2−A1+3A0
1−A2+A1−A0 .
B.2. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2











( − φ + γ δφ) + 1 1
β
γ δ − 1
β
( − φ + γ δφ) δ + 1
β
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The coefficients of the characteristic polynomia, as in (B.1), are








A1 = µ1µ2+µ2µ3+µ1µ3 =








Applying the conformal transformation to get the Hurwitz polynomial yields
B0 = (1 − φ)σ (1 − β − δ)
(1 + β − δ) [2 (1 + β) + (1 − φ)σ ] + 2σγδ (1 + βφ) = − (ψ1ψ2ψ3),
B1=σ (1 − φ) [δ (1 + 2γ ) − 1 − β] + 2 (β − 1) ((β − 1) + δ)
(1 + β − δ) [2 (1 + β) + (1 − φ)σ ] + 2σγδ (1 + βφ) =ψ1ψ2+ψ2ψ3+ψ3ψ1,
B2 =
(1 − φ) σ (β − 1 + δ) + 4 [β2 − 1 + δ (σγ − 1)]





For the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) to be unique, the polynomial PH (ψ) must
display exactly one negative root. It follows that we need B0 to be positive and at least one
at B1 and B2 to be negative. The first condition implies that PH (ψ) has either one or three
negative roots. When B0 > 0, the second condition implies, by Decartes’ rule of sign, that
PH (ψ) has either two or zero positive roots. However, when B0 > 0 and either B1 or B2
(or both) are negative, PH (−ψ) displays only one sign change; hence PH (ψ) has exactly
one negative root.
Proof strategy: we study the sign of B0 in the policy space φ − δ, and we restrict the
study of the sign of B1 and B2 to the policy space where B0 is positive. We separately
consider the cases where  > 0 and  < 0.15
Case  > 0.
Assumption 1. γ < 1
σ
(see main text for a discussion about this assumption).
In this case the numerator of B0, is positive iff
[φ > 1 ∩ δ > (1 − β)] ∪ [φ < 1 ∩ δ < (1 − δ)] , (B.9)
whereas the denominator of B0 is positive iff[
φ ∈ (0, ¯φ) ∩ δ < ( ¯δ)] ∪ [φ /∈ (0, ¯φ) ∩ δ > ( ¯δ)] , (B.10)
where ¯φ = 2(1+β)+σ−2γσ
σ+2βγσ and ¯δ = −2(1+β)
2−σ((1+β)(1−φ))
−2(1+β)−σ(1−φ−2γ(1+βφ)) . Note that if Assumption 1
holds, then ¯φ > 1 . Hence B0 > 0 iff[
φ ∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] ∪ [φ /∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ /∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] . (B.11)
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Note that if λ or γ equals zero, then ¯δ = 1 + β and ¯φ = 1 + 2(1+β)
σ
. Next we study the
sign of B2. For φ > 1 and δ > 1 − β, the numerator of B2 is always negative. On the other
hand, if φ < 1, the numerator of B2 is negative iff
δ /∈ (1 − β, δ˜), (B.12)
where δ˜ = −σ(1−β)(1−φ)+4(1−β)(1+β)4−σ(1−φ+4γ) . Hence, it follows that B2 < 0 if[
φ ∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)]
∪ [φ > ( ¯φ) ∩ δ > ¯δ]
∪ [φ < 1 ∩ δ /∈ (1 − β, δ˜)] . (B.13)
Note that for standard parameterization, ¯δ > δ˜ if φ < 1.16 Therefore the necessary and
sufficient condition for REE is[
φ ∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] ∪ [φ /∈ (1, ¯φ) ∩ δ /∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] . (B.14)
Case  < 0.
Assumption 2.  ≤ −2+2β2γ σ+σφ+2γ σφ (see main text for a discussion about this assumption).
The numerator of B0 > 0 iff[
φ ∈ (max (0, ¯φ) , 1) ∩ δ > (1 − β)] ∪ [φ > 1 ∩ δ < (1 − β)] , (B.15)
whereas the denominator of B0 > 0 iff[
φ > 0 ∩ δ < ¯δ ] . (B.16)
Note that ¯δ ∈ (1 − β, 1 + β) .17
Hence B0 > 0 iff {
φ ∈ [max (0, ¯φ) , 1] ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)}
∪ [φ > 1 ∩ δ /∈ (1 − δ, ¯δ)] . (B.17)
We now focus on the study of the sign of B2. It is easy to show that the numerator of B2 is
positive iff [
φ < 1 ∩ δ < δ˜] ∪ [φ > 1 ∩ δ > δ˜] . (B.18)
It follows that B2 < 0 iff[
φ > 1 ∩ δ /∈ (˜δ, ¯δ)] ∪ [φ < 1 ∩ δ ∈ (˜δ, ¯δ)] , (B.19)
where δ˜ < (1 − β) < ¯δ. Hence, when φ > 1∩δ ∈ (˜δ, 1 − β) , both B0 and B2 are positive.
Therefore, for Decartes’ rule of signs, two positive roots require B1 < 0 in the policy space[
φ > 1 ∩ δ ∈ (˜δ, 1 − β)] . It is easy to show that in this policy space the denominator of
B1 is positive, whereas its numerator is negative. Therefore, when [φ > 1 ∩ δ < 1 − β],
the system is determinate.
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) ∩ δ ∈ (1 − β, ¯δ)] ∪ [φ > 1 ∩ δ /∈ (1 − δ, ¯δ)] (B.20)
Q.E.D.
The derivatives of ¯δ












−σ [1 − φ − 2γ (1 + 2βγ)][
2 (1 + β)2 + σ (1 + β) (1 − φ)]
−σ (1 + β) (1 − φ)
( −2 − 2β − σ
+2γσ + σφ + 2βγσφ
)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦












σ (1 + 2βγ) [2 (1 + β)2 + σ (1 + β) (1 − φ)]
+σ (1 + β) (−2 − 2β − σ + 2γσ + σφ + 2βγσφ)
]







2 (1 + β)2 + σ (1 + β) (1 − φ)] 2σ (1 + φβ)
(−2 − 2β − σ + 2γσ + σφ + 2βγσφ)2
]
. (B.23)




is always positive for λ 
= η
ϕ(1+η)2 .
Furthermore,[ −σ [1 − φ − 2γ (1 + 2βγ)] [2 (1 + β)2 + σ (1 + β) (1 − φ)]
−σ (1 + β) (1 − φ) (−2 − 2β − σ + 2γσ + σφ + 2βγσφ)
]
(−2 − 2β − σ + 2γσ + σφ + 2βγσφ)2 > 0
regardless of the sign of .
The numerator of ∂ ¯δ
∂φ
is positive if  > 0∩ φ ∈ (0, ¯φ), and negative if  < 0∩
φ ∈ (0, ¯φ), whereas the denominator is always positive.
The numerator of ∂ ¯δ
∂γ
is positive iff  > 0 ∩ φ > 0, and negative if  < 0 ∩ φ > 0,
whereas the denominator is always positive.
Ultimately, when  > 0, the derivatives of ¯δ with respect to γ, λ, and φ are positive and
if either λ or γ equals zero, then ¯δ = 1 + β. Hence if  > 0, ¯δ is bounded below by 1 + β.
On the other hand, when  < 0, ¯δ is decreasing in γ and φ and increasing in λ. Note that
∂ ¯δ
∂λ
> 0 and as λ → 1 and/or γ = 0, ¯δ = 1 + β. Hence if  < 0, ¯δ is bounded above by
1 + β.
